The Royals looked to avoid a sweep on Wednesday night at Fenway Park. Unfortunately, they didn’t get off to a great start, as they were down 2-1 going into the fourth at the time of this writing (they also stranded Bobby Witt Jr., who was in scoring position with zero outs in the third).
Thankfully, the Royals came back and won 7-3 thanks to some clutch hitting and another excellent outing from Michael Wacha.
One of the particular changes manager Matt Quatraro made in this much-needed win was moving Jonathan India down in the batting order (seventh), with newcomer Mike Yastrzemski leading off in game three of the series.
Quatraro said moving India out of the leadoff spot wasn’t performance-related. Nonetheless, it was interesting to see Q make the move with India posting a .658 OPS this season and .521 OPS so far in August.
Royals fans will see if India’s being out of the leadoff spot is a one-game experiment or a sign of things to come. Yaz has undoubtedly made his case to be the regular leadoff hitter against right-handed starting pitchers tonight, as he is 2-2 with a double and a run scored so far.
Even if India moves down in the batting order, it’s safe to say that India’s first season in Kansas City has been a bit of a disappointment.
In 105 games and 454 plate appearances, India has a slash of .236/.322/.336 with five home runs, 32 RBI, 49 runs scored, and a wOBA of .297. He has posted a solid 0.55 BB/K ratio, and his 16.7% strikeout rate is 2.9% lower than his mark in Cincinnati last season.
While his plate patience has remained solid, his power has declined in the move from the Great American Ballpark to Kauffman Stadium. He has seen a dramatic dip in ISO (.144 in 2024 to .100 in 2025), and his rolling slugging percentage chart demonstrates a mediocre trend (though that seemed to stem back to the latter half of the 2024 season).
To make matters worse, it’s not just the hitting side where India has struggled this season.
His BsR (Baserunning Runs) is 1.8 runs below average, and his Def (defensive run value) is 11.2 runs below replacement level, according to Fangraphs. As a result, India is producing a -0.6 fWAR this season, which would be a career low and his worst season since 2022 (when his fWAR was 0.2 in 103 games with the Reds).
I wondered if India would be floated at the Trade Deadline, especially with him being a free agent after the 2026 season. However, it seems GM JJ Picollo didn’t find any takers or a trade return suitable enough, especially with Michael Massey struggling and on the IL (and what could be for a good while, as he was recently returned to the IL after a rehab stint in Omaha).
Even though the Royals may be sticking with India for the remainder of 2025, it doesn’t seem like a guarantee that he’ll be back in 2026, especially with him entering his last year of arbitration.
Thus, in this post, let’s examine India’s struggles this season, explore alternative options internally for the Royals to consider as India’s replacement next year, and discuss whether the financial implications of India’s pending roster spot could lead to his trade or non-tender this offseason.
Offensive Struggles
As mentioned before, it’s been a significant decline for India this year, as his decline in wOBA from .333 in 2024 with the Reds to .297 this season demonstrates that. His rolling wOBA chart this year hasn’t shown much promise either, as he hasn’t had many stretches this year where his wOBA mark has been above average at any point this season.
As I mentioned before, the plate discipline, a primary reason why the Royals targeted and acquired India this offseason, has still been solid this season. When looking at his TJ Stats Statcast sliders, he ranks in the upper percentiles in essential categories like O-Swing% (i.e., chase), whiff, Z-Contact%, and K percentage.
Unfortunately, his batted-ball categories show an inverse trend via the Statcast data, as seen in his TJ Stats profile below.
It was expected that India would see some regression in home runs in the move from the homer-friendly GAB to Kauffman. However, even though the K is a tough place to hit homers, it traditionally has been friendly to hitters who can hit it in the gaps or down the line due to its spacious dimensions.
According to 3-year Statcast Park Factors, the Royals rank 10th in Park Factor with a 101 mark and rank 4th in doubles (114) and third in triples (188). Thus, with his decent pull rate (61st percentile), one would think that India would have collected more doubles and triples in the move to the K.
That hasn’t happened.
While his hard-hit rate at 36.2% is the same as from a year ago, his barrel rate is down by 2.2%. Furthermore, his infield fly ball percentage is 14.5%, a 3.8% increase from a year ago. It’s hard to find the gaps, regardless of the park, when the ball is popped up in the air more than typically for him.
Furthermore, he’s not hitting the ball into the gap as much as he did in 2024 and instead is pulling more groundballs to the third-base side, which often leads to groundouts.
Here’s a look at his spray heatmap from 2024 (at GAB) and 2025 (at Kauffman). Notice the difference, especially in the outfield area.
When comparing the two heatmaps, there’s a lot more blue in shallow left-center, as well as right-center and right field in general. On the 2025 heatmap, there’s a lot more green in those areas, which signifies that he hasn’t gotten base hits there. If he had transitioned his 2024 heatmap to 2025, his numbers would look significantly better overall, mainly since those 2024 blue areas would still have produced hits at Kauffman Stadium.
Thus, a decline in home run power (further evidenced by a 3.6% HR/FB rate) has led to his regression in 2025 offensively. However, he just isn’t finding the gaps this year like he did a year ago, which partially explains why his xwOBA of .332 is so much higher than his actual wOBA.
India’s Defensive Struggles
It would be one thing if India were struggling offensively, but producing value with the glove or on the basepaths. The Royals have certainly seen players who have showcased that type to varying degrees of success.
Unfortunately, neither has been good this season.
According to Savant, he is one run below average in runner runs. That is one run worse than a year ago and four runs worse than his mark in 2023.
To put salt in the wound, unfortunately, his defense has been even worse.
The Royals tried to utilize India in a multi-positional role this year, even though he exclusively played second base in his four seasons in Cincinnati. The experiment failed miserably for India and the Royals, as evidenced by India’s Outs Above Average (OAA) data via Savant.
Despite limited time at 3B and LF, he produced a -7 OAA at the two positions combined. His success rate was also five percent below expected in third and eight percent below expected in left field.
While the poor play at two new positions is not surprising, the lackluster play at second base, his original position, is more alarming. He has produced a -7 OAA at the keystone this season, and sports a success rate that is four percent below expected, as of Wednesday. He had a +1 OAA and had a success rate that was one percent ABOVE expected a year ago with the Reds.
His OAA Box Plot chart also shows India’s struggles on all kinds of plays at all three positions this season. This concerning trend further proves that he’s been a liability this season defensively, which puts his long-term future in Kansas City in doubt.
The Royals have been a good defensive team on an OAA basis this season, according to Savant. They rank seventh overall in baseball with a +15 OAA mark as a team. However, they’ve been heavily weighed down by India, who has produced a -14 OAA so far this year.
Look at where India compares to other Royals fielders on an OAA end. It’s not a pretty picture.
Royals fans have to wonder what this team could be defensively if India were at least slightly below average defensively.
If India were even three outs below average (which is the second-worst mark on the team), the Royals would have a +26 OAA. That would be the second-best mark in baseball behind the St. Louis Cardinals.
That kind of gap can be the difference between a couple of wins and perhaps a spot in the postseason. That should show the impact of India’s porous fielding this season, and why Picollo may debate keeping India for 2026.
What Are Other Options Internally for 2026?
If the Royals part with India, they could opt for other internal options like Massey or Nick Loftin. Unfortunately, neither player has been tremendous offensively this season.
In 209 plate appearances, Massey is slashing .202/.221/.258 with a .470 OPS. Until he landed on the IL, the 27-year-old second baseman was one of the worst regular players in all of baseball, further illustrated by his -1.1 fWAR in 56 games.
As for Loftin, his slash hasn’t been much better at .197/.234/.333. Loftin’s OPS is nearly a 100 points higher than Massey’s at .567, but a sub-.600 OPS is nothing to brag about.
Their TJ Stats profiles are pretty similar, as they both profile as high-contact hitters with low whiff rates but little power and hard-hit ability.
Massey at least pulls the ball more, especially in the air. That said, it’s pretty much a coin flip between Massey and Loftin when it comes to which Royals-drafted-and-developed second baseman has the better long-term outlook, especially on the offensive end.
Another option for the Royals could be to bring back Adam Frazier on a one-year deal, similar to the one he signed before the 2023 season. However, he will be 34 years old in 2026, and his exit velocity and hard-hit metrics are arguably worse than Massey and Loftin’s (though the plate discipline metrics are pretty similar).
On a positive note, Frazier is producing a +2 OAA this year overall, with a +3 OAA at second base, according to Savant. Thus, he has more defensive upside than India, Massey (0 OAA), and Loftin (+1 OAA).
If the Royals want to give someone in the system a chance, the only two realistic options are Peyton Wilson, who’s in Omaha, and Javier Vaz, who’s in Northwest Arkansas. Both players will need to be added to the 40-man roster this offseason to protect them from the Rule 5 Draft (though Wilson went unprotected and undrafted in last December’s draft).
While there’s intriguing defense and baserunning upside with both players, neither has been all that stellar with the bat, as demonstrated by their TJ Stats player cards below.
Wilson is producing a .267 wOBA in Omaha with a 26% strikeout rate. As for Vaz, he doesn’t strike out often (7.5%), and he walks a lot (10.8%). However, he provides little power, as demonstrated by his .291 wOBA. His profile makes Nicky Lopez look like a slugger.
Thus, the options look pretty thin and grim for 2026 if the Royals want to stay within their roster and/or system to find a solution at the keystone.
The Financial Challenges With India
India is currently in the last year of an extension he signed with the Reds after the 2023 season and makes $7.05 million this season via Spotrac. That said, he does not have a deal for 2026, which means the Royals have to negotiate a contract this offseason or enter arbitration.
Based on his experience and his previous deal with Cincinnati, he could be due for a raise of $2-3 million, meaning he would be due around $10 million for 2026. That seems like a hefty price to pay for one more season of a player with sub-replacement level fWAR.
To make matters more complicated for India and his future with the Royals, Kansas City will be dealing with a multitude of arbitration-eligible players next offseason.
There are two categories of arbitration-eligible players that I will look at: Ones nearing the end of their arbitration period and ones just entering.
Here’s a look at the players entering their final years of arbitration, according to Roster Resource payroll data.
Yaz and Hunter Harvey will be free agents after this season, and it’s likely both will be signing with other clubs in 2026. Kris Bubic will be entering his last year of arbitration, as are John Schreiber and Kyle Wright. Bubic and Schreiber will be locks to return, with Bubic perhaps an extension candidate.
Wright, on the other hand, seems like an easy DFA candidate, especially since he hasn’t pitched an inning for the Royals since coming over in a trade with Atlanta two offseasons ago. The same DFA fate could be true for MJ Melendez, who has three more years of arbitration but is currently toiling away in Triple-A after a disastrous 2025.
If that wasn’t enough, the Royals also have a slew of intriguing players who will be entering arbitration for the first time.
Long probably is an easy DFA candidate, especially since he is out of Minor League options. However, the Royals could justify bringing back every other player listed beyond Long, though all those players will likely see a raise in their salary for 2026. That only adds to the payroll, which puts less money out there to spend on free agency. (And that’s not even including potential extensions to Maikel Garcia and Vinnie Pasquantino, who have had solid seasons.)
Thus, that’s 11 players that the Royals will have to negotiate contracts for in 2026. Is a 12th one worth it with India? He will have to turn it around over the next two months to make the Royals more inclined to bring him back and pay him in the $8-10 million range (and that’s the low end).
Thankfully, India seemed to take a step in the right direction on Wednesday with a big three-run home run that helped give the Royals a comfortable lead against the Red Sox.
The Bat X projects a .260/.350/.405 slash and four home runs, 22 runs scored, 19 RBI, and a 110 wRC+ in 43 games down the stretch. For India to come back, he needs to produce something similar to those numbers, if not slightly better.
Not just for his long-term future’s sake, but the Royals and their postseason chances as well.
Photo Credit: Sam Navarro-Imagn Images
[…] him with newcomer Mike Yastrzemski. Quatraro said the move was “matchup-based,” but after a difficult first season in Kansas City, it seems like the Royals are open to having other options at leadoff going […]
Should have never traded away Brady Singer. India has been a disaster from day one.
I still don’t fault the move. Singer has been fine this year, but slightly worse than a year ago. He also will be a free agent and we likely wouldn’t have kept him. The process was good, it’s just that it didn’t work out.